

The document is of interest to American officials as a detailed, if limited, snapshot of communications between Iraqi intelligence and Mr. bin Laden, but this view ends with Mr. bin Laden's departure from Sudan. At that point, Iraqi intelligence officers began "seeking other channels through which to handle the relationship, in light of his current location," the document states.

Members of the Pentagon task force that reviewed the document said it described no formal alliance being reached between Mr. bin Laden and Iraqi intelligence. The Iraqi document itself states that "cooperation between the two organizations should be allowed to develop freely through discussion and agreement."

The heated public debate over links between Mr. bin Laden and the Hussein government fall basically into three categories: the extent of communications and contacts between the two, the level of actual cooperation, and any specific collaboration in the Sept. 11 attacks.

The document provides evidence of communications between Mr. bin Laden and Iraqi intelligence, similar to that described in the Sept. 11 staff report released last week.

"Bin Laden also explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to Hussein's secular regime," the Sept. 11 commission report stated.

The Sudanese government, the commission report added, "arranged for contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda."

"A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan," it said, "finally meeting bin Laden in 1994. Bin Laden is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded."

The Sept. 11 commission statement said there were reports of further contacts with Iraqi intelligence in Afghanistan after Mr. bin Laden's departure from Sudan, "but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship," it added.

After the Sept. 11 commission released its staff reports last week, President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney said they remained convinced that Mr. Hussein's government had a long history of ties to Al Qaeda.

"This administration never said that the 9/11 attacks were orchestrated between Saddam and Al Qaeda," Mr. Bush said. "We did say there were numerous contacts between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. For example, Iraqi intelligence officers met with bin Laden, the head of Al Qaeda, in the Sudan. There's numerous contacts between the two."

It is not clear whether the commission knew of this document. After its report was released, Mr. Cheney said he might have been privy to more information than the commission had; it is not known whether any further information has changed hands.

A spokesman for the Sept. 11 commission declined to say whether it had seen the Iraqi document, saying its policy was not to discuss its sources.

The Iraqi document states that Mr. bin Laden's organization in Sudan was called "The Advice and Reform Commission." The Iraqis were cued to make their approach to Mr. bin Laden in 1994 after a Sudanese official visited Uday Hussein, the leader's son, as well as the director of Iraqi intelligence, and indicated that Mr. bin Laden was willing to meet in Sudan.

A former director of operations for Iraqi intelligence Directorate 4 met with Mr. bin Laden on Feb. 19 1995, the document states.

Mr. KYL. I note, concluding with this point, that Abdul Yasim and Abu Nidal

were harbored in Iraq. The Taliban did not directly involve itself in 9/11 or have weapons of mass destruction either, but it harbored people like this and that is one reason we went after the Taliban and Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.

With regard to the connections between Iraq and al-Qaida, the case is very clear that they were there and the President stands correct, and I hope the Senator from Massachusetts would stand corrected.

Finally, as to the suggestion that Iraq was a diversion from succeeding in Afghanistan, that we have not finished the job there, we were very successful in defeating the Taliban and killing a lot of al-Qaida and capturing a lot of al-Qaida in Afghanistan, and in establishing a regime there which will be holding elections. Karzai made it very clear when he came to this country and expressed his appreciation, just as did Prime Minister Allawi of Iraq, to American forces for helping to provide the Afghanis with enough freedom to control their own future. I think there is confusion that the only al-Qaida are on the border between Afghan and Pakistan, and since we have not captured every single one of them, including Osama bin Laden, therefore our activities in Iraq are responsible for this fact. There has been no evidence of that. As a matter of fact, our military commanders make the point it is not true, that Iraq was not a diversion from anything we had to do in Afghanistan where we were very effective and successful.

To those who convey this sense of panic, that all is going bad, the opposite of that is not those of us who support the President's policy saying everything is rosy. I do not know that anybody has ever used that phrase. If they have, I would like to see it. The President has said repeatedly that this is a long and difficult war and it is going to require a great deal of perseverance and commitment by the American people. But as contrasted by those who create the sense of panic, the President has a vision and the President's commanders have a strategy. When I saw General Abizaid on television last Sunday, he didn't paint a rosy picture. He painted a very realistic assessment. But he also portrayed a calm confidence that if we can persevere we can prevail.

That is what he asked of the American people, to allow the military commanders as well as the Commander in Chief to carry out the vision to defeat the militant Islamic terrorists wherever they are. As I said, they are not only in Afghanistan; they are all over the world including primarily in the Middle East. That is why this war has many fronts. It is not just Afghanistan. We fought simultaneously to try to gain support from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Libyan regime, and from Syria. We did what we did in Afghanistan. We have done what we have done in Iraq. There are still some places to

go, but we have also been in Yemen and Sudan, and so on.

The bottom line here is you can't isolate one place in the world and say we have to do that first and win every possible goal there before we can do anything else anywhere else. The President has made it clear that by going to one of the chief sources of terrorism, namely Iraq, we can help to win this war.

The fact that there was such a connection between the terrorists—between al-Qaida and the Iraqi regime—is I think validated by the fact that they have been able to so successfully continue to attack Americans and American forces in Iraq.

Let's consider that the military commanders just might know what they are talking about, No. 1. No. 2, it does no good to wring our hands and paint a picture of panic. Realistic assessments, absolutely; truth to the American people, absolutely; but leadership that presents a vision and a strategy for winning the wider war on terrorism, that is what the President has provided. That is why I am very proud to support President Bush's efforts in this regard.<sup>3</sup>

#### RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, leadership time is reserved.

#### NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will resume consideration of S. 2845, which the clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 2845) to reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, and for other purposes.

Pending:

Wyden Amendment No. 3704, to establish an Independent National Security Classification Board in the executive branch.

Collins Amendment No. 3705, to provide for homeland security grant coordination and simplification.

Specter Amendment No. 3706, to provide the National Intelligence Director with the authority to supervise, direct, and control all elements of the intelligence community performing national intelligence missions.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the debate now will resume on the amendment offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania. As discussed last night, we have an informal agreement that Senator ROBERTS would be recognized for—is it 25 minutes, I ask Senator ROBERTS?

Mr. ROBERTS. I thought the agreement was 30.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I could not hear the Senator from Maine. She said there had been an order that the Senator be recognized?

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if I can respond to the Democratic leader's inquiry, there was an informal discussion